A key rationale for fiscal stimulus is to boost consumption when aggregate demand is perceived to be inefficiently low. We examine the ability of the government to increase consumption by evaluating the impact of the 2009 "Cash for Clunkers" program on short and medium run auto purchases. Our empirical strategy exploits variation across U.S. cities in ex-ante exposure to the program as measured by the number of "clunkers" in the city as of the summer of 2008. We find that the program induced the purchase of an additional 360,000 cars in July and August of 2009. However, almost all of the additional purchases under the program were pulled forward from the very near future; the effect of the program on auto purchases is almost completely reversed by as early as March 2010 -only seven months after the program ended. The effect of the program on auto purchases was significantly more short-lived than previously suggested. We also find no evidence of an effect on employment, house prices, or household default rates in cities with higher exposure to the program.
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One of the most vociferous and consequential debates in economics is whether governments can spur economic activity through fiscal interventions. The issue has received heightened attention during the most recent recession as "Keynesians" call for large and sudden fiscal interventions in the economy. However, other economists are diametrically opposed, arguing that fiscal stimulus is at best irrelevant and at worst harmful.
A key point of contention is the speed with which private sector adjustment nullifies fiscal interventions. Proponents argue that fiscal stimulus can bring forward aggregate demand from "well in the future" -when the economy will be operating at close to capacity -to today when there is substantial slack and hence higher marginal benefit of production.
1 Opponents contend that the private sector offsets the effects of fiscal interventions almost immediately, negating any benefits while worsening the nation's fiscal situation.
We address this issue by analyzing the 2009 Cars Allowance Rebate System (CARS)
program, commonly referred to as "Cash for Clunkers". The program consisted of government payments to car dealers of $3,500 to $4,500 for every older less fuel efficient vehicle traded in by consumers that purchased a newer more fuel efficient vehicle. While the program was national in scope, its impact on a given city depended on the number of qualifying "clunkers".
Our research design forms treatment and control groups utilizing cross-sectional variation across U.S. cities in exposure to the CARS program. We employ this research design to assess both the initial impact of the program and the degree to which the program shifted purchases forward from the very near future.
Why study CARS? First, the CARS program is representative of a large number of fiscal stimulus programs. Similar programs were implemented in France, Italy, and Spain (Adda and Cooper (2000)). CARS also shares features with the first-time homebuyer credit passed as part of the stimulus program, which is estimated to cost $15 billion, and the "cash for caulkers" program currently being debated in Congress, which would cost $6 billion.
Second, the effect of government spending is likely to vary across the economic cycle. In particular, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010) argue that the fiscal multiplier is likely to be different in times of economic weakness (see also Christiano, et al (2009) and Woodford (2010) ).
The debate on fiscal stimulus is most relevant for programs that are implemented in the midst of recessions, and CARS is one such program.
Perhaps most importantly, the heated debates surrounding the program are representative of broader disagreement on the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus. Leading economists strongly supported CARS both before and after its implementation. Alan Blinder introduced the basic idea in the summer of 2008, calling it "the best stimulus idea you've never heard of" (Blinder (2008) ). Christina Romer and Christopher Carroll considered CARS a success in April 2010 because it stimulated spending by "thrifty people" which "is nearly the best possible countercyclical fiscal policy in an economy suffering from temporarily low aggregate demand" (Romer and Carroll (2010) ).
The praise for CARS is not universal however. Gary Becker concluded in August 2009
that "there is little to be said at any level in defense of a cash-for-clunkers program" (Becker (2010) ). The Wall Street Journal Editorial Board called the program "one of Washington's alltime dumb ideas" (WSJ (2009)). A systematic look at the data is warranted in order to resolve this important debate.
We examine the effectiveness of the program in boosting auto sales using a city-level data set that includes information on important outcomes, such as the types of cars registered in the city as of the summer 2008, monthly auto purchases, and employment. 2 We use this data set to test whether cities with more clunkers, and therefore greater exposure to the CARS program, exhibit differential patterns in auto purchases and other economic outcomes.
We find that the CARS program induced a large increase in automobile purchases during the two months of the program. Our preferred measure of ex ante exposure is the number of clunkers in a city as of 2008 scaled by monthly automobile purchases in 2004 (the first year of our data). We find that a one standard deviation increase in ex ante exposure lead to a 2/3 standard deviation increase in auto purchases in July and August of 2009. There is no evidence of a differential pre-trend in high and low clunker cities, and the increase corresponds exactly with the timing of the program.
Under the identifying assumption that cities with very low numbers of clunkers were unaffected by the program, our estimate implies that approximately 360,000 cars were purchased under the program during July and August 2009 that would otherwise not have been purchased.
However, we also find that most vehicle purchases induced by the program were borrowed from purchases that would have otherwise occurred in the very near future. In the subsequent ten months after the program (September 2009 through June 2010), high clunker cities purchased significantly fewer automobiles than low clunker cities. By the end of March 2010, seven months after the program, the cumulative purchases of high and low clunker cities from July 2009 to March 2010 were almost the same. In other words, the relative impact of the program on high clunker cities was almost completely reversed in just seven months.
There are a number of challenges in estimating the incremental effect of the CARS program using cross-sectional variation across U.S. cities. For example, U.S. cities with a large number of clunkers differ on characteristics that could be responsible for the results we find. In particular, high CARS exposure cities have a more rural composition, higher unemployment, lower house prices, and less exposure to the recession's household defaults and house price declines. However, our results are robust to the inclusion of controls for these differences and other covariates. Further, the precise pattern we witness-a sharp rise in auto purchases during the program with subsequently lower purchases afterward-is difficult to reconcile with an explanation that is unrelated to the CARS program.
Statistical inference is also confounded by the fact that shocks to auto purchases for different cities in the same month are likely not independent. We handle the inference problem in a number of ways. One test is to estimate the full set of placebo tests using every other month in We also utilize city-level quarterly data on house prices, household defaults, and employment to test whether the CARS program had a measurable effect on other economic outcomes. Cities with high CARS exposure show no noticeable difference in economic outcomes from before the program to after the program relative to cities with low CARS exposure. We also examine economic outcomes for cities that have a high number of employees working in the auto industry. There is some evidence that high auto employment share cities had a relative increase in employment after the CARS program, but there is no noticeable effect on either house prices or household defaults. We should caution however that the effect of CARS on employment in the automobile industry is difficult to separate from the federal bailouts of General Motors and
Chrysler in early 2009.
While there are important advantages of our microeconomic empirical approach, there are some important caveats that we discuss in the last section. One we want to mention at the outset is the difficulty in measuring the aggregate effect of the program on the entire economy.
Given our reliance on low CARS exposure cities as a control group, if the CARS program had an aggregate level effect on the entire economy, our empirical strategy would be unable to detect it.
However, any argument that the CARS program had such a level positive level effect must be consistent with (a) the sharp relative reduction in auto purchases we find in high CARS exposure cities after the program, and (b) the lack of any discernable relative impact on employment, house prices, or household defaults in high versus low CARS exposure cities.
We are not the first to use variation at the micro-level to estimate the effect of government stimulus programs. Using random variation in the timing of stimulus payments, Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006) find a strong effect of the 2001 tax cuts on non-durable consumption, especially for balance sheet constrained individuals (see also Agarwal, Liu, and Souleles (2009) The inter-temporal "crowding out" effect that we document in this paper is consistent with models that incorporate the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis, such as Barro (1974 Barro ( , 1979 .
However, we want to caution against an over-interpretation of our findings. The ultimate impact of fiscal stimulus also depends on the form of the stimulus package. Our paper tests for a particular form of intervention -namely a monetary incentive for durable goods purchases. It is conceivable that there may be alternative forms of fiscal stimulus that have longer-lasting effects than CARS.
The rest of our study proceeds as follows. In Section 1 we describe the program in more detail and discuss the extant empirical evidence on its success. In Section 2 we present the data.
In Section 3 we present the empirical methodology. Sections 4 and 5 present the results and Section 6 concludes.
Car Allowance Rebate System (CARS): Description and Extant Research
As 4 The specific amount of the credit depended on the fuel efficiency improvement of the transaction. Using the eligibility rules set forth by the NHTSA, the company Edmunds.com published a list of all vehicles that qualified for the program. there is a noticeable spike in auto purchases during the program. There is also a noticeable decline afterwards.
What was the effect of the CARS program on auto purchases? The fundamental empirical challenge to answering this question is that the counter-factual outcomes in the absence of the program are unobserved. In order to evaluate the program, a research design must form a reasonable estimate of the pattern in auto purchases and other economic outcomes if the program 4 For the specific set of eligibility rules, see We provide a detailed discussion of these approaches and their drawbacks in the appendix. To summarize here, it is extremely difficult to estimate counter-factual outcomes using aggregate data. As Figure 1 shows, auto sales patterns were volatile in the months preceding the program.
Further, there is some evidence of a rebound in sales in the spring of 2009 which may have continued through the summer even in the absence of CARS.
Finally, many spikes in auto purchases are due to incentive programs by car dealers and manufacturers, and it is therefore impossible to assess the impact of CARS using aggregate data alone. For example, the increase in auto purchases in March 2010 was due to Toyota's offers of subsidized leases and interest-free financing which were mimicked by other manufacturers.
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Would this have occurred in the absence of CARS? It is almost impossible to address such questions using aggregate data.
Our approach is to form counter-factual outcomes based on cross-sectional variation across U.S. cities in their exposure to the CARS program. 7 The advantages of this approach are clear. By forming a control group that we can follow over time, we can more realistically assess the counter-factual outcome for cities with a large number of clunkers. The control group is allowed to respond to aggregate shocks such as the March 2010 incentives. Figure 2 shows that there was a large degree of variation across U.S. states in purchases under the CARS program. Each state is shaded by the ratio of total purchases under CARS scaled by 2004 auto purchases, with darker shades being a higher ratio. 8 Purchases under the program were highest in the upper plains states and the northwest and extreme northeast. They were lowest in the south. It is such cross-sectional variation in CARS take-up that we use to assess the impact of the program.
Data and Summary Statistics

A. Data
Our data set includes 957 U.S. metropolitan or micropolitan statistical areas (CBSAs) for which we have a number of economic outcomes available from January 2004 through June 2010.
Throughout the text, we refer to these CBSAs as "cities. Our list of qualifying clunkers comes from Edmunds.com. 9 They use qualification rules based on miles per gallon and trade-in value to form a list of all model-years that qualify for the program. We match this list to the registered vehicles data from R.L. Polk. Given that the R.L.
Polk data includes only the number of vehicles by year-broad category, the match is not perfect.
For most broad R.L. Polk categories, there are models within the category that are considered clunkers and some that are not considered clunkers. Our main approach is to count all vehicles in an R.L. Polk category-year as a clunker if any of the model-years that are under the broad category-year are part of the Edmunds.com list.
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There is clearly measurement error given that the R.L. Polk data on registered cars is not available at the model-year level. However, the measurement error is likely to be random and is therefore more likely to bias the results toward finding no initial impact of the program. As we show below, our measure of the amount of clunkers in a given state strongly predicts actual purchases under CARS at the state level, and we find a strong initial effect of the program on auto purchases at the city-level.
We also use data from other sources. City-level data on demographics, median household income, and median house prices come from the 2000 Decennial Census. City-quarterly information on household default rates, credit card utilization rates, and debt levels are from Equifax Predictive Services (see appendix of ). City-quarterly information on house prices is from FHFA, city-quarterly data on unemployment is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and city-annual data on household income is from the IRS. Many of these data sets are available at the zip code level. We use data from the company Zip-codes.com to match zip codes to counties and CBSAs.
Finally, we choose to conduct our analysis at the CBSA-level because CBSA is defined as the naturally integrated economic unit. For example, in the Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL CBSA, many individuals living in Cook County may choose to purchase cars in DuPage County. 
B. Summary Statistics
Empirical Methodology
A. Research Design
Our empirical strategy exploits across-city variation in exposure to CARS to assess the broader economic impact of the program. The thought experiment is as follows. Suppose there are two cities, one in which everyone owns a clunker and one in which no one owns a clunker.
The experiment uses the non-clunker city as a control group to assess the counter-factual level of auto purchases in the absence of the program for the clunker city. This allows for an estimate of the marginal impact of the CARS program.
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In order to implement this research design, we must first make a decision on the precise measure of exposure to CARS. Conceptually, we would like to measure which cities contain clunker owners that are most likely to be induced to make a purchase under the program. This is not straightforward. Two cities with the same number of clunkers may have different propensities to take up the program. For example, cities may vary in their propensities to buy new cars. Cities may also vary in the number of individuals that own cars. Further, some clunker owners may be unable to afford a high fuel efficiency vehicle even with the tax credit. Finally, 12 In theory, the control group may react to the program by reducing auto purchases given the expectation of future taxes to make up for the subsidy to the high CARS cities. However, such a reaction is likely to be small. The size of CARS is small relative to total fiscal stimulus spending and households would reduce consumption of all goods in response, not just autos.
clunker owners may buy a new car on behalf of their extended family or friends and such propensity may vary across cities. 
We use three potential scalars: the number of 2004 auto purchases, the number of households, and the number of automobiles. The matrix X includes control variables that are likely to be correlated with auto purchases in a given city. These control variables are discussed in more detail below.
The results are in Table 2 Why is the ratio of qualifying clunkers to total 2004 auto purchases the best predictor of actual take-up? One potential reason is the large amount of across-city variation in automobile turnover. Cities vary significantly in the frequency with which residents buy new cars. This could be related to factors such as income, job mobility, and demographic makeup. Thus comparing two cities with equal turnover is the best way of isolating the effect of the program.
B. Covariates
Research designs produce the cleanest estimates when treatment and control groups are randomly assigned. Unfortunately, the number of clunkers in a given city is not randomly assigned. Given non-random assignment, the concern is that other characteristics unrelated to the CARS program are responsible for the differential purchase patterns in high and low CARS exposure cities.
In order to address this concern, we first provide evidence on the correlation of our measure of CARS exposure with variables that are likely to affect auto purchase patterns. These variables include measures of earnings (median household income, unemployment, and the change in unemployment), measures of balance sheet strength (household default rate, the change in the household default rate, the credit card utilization rate, the median house price, and recent house price growth), and measures of demographics (fraction of zip codes in the city that are urban, the total number of households). The measures of balance sheet strength follow from Mian and Sufi (2010) who show that household defaults, credit card utilization, and house price declines are strongly correlated with auto purchase patterns.
Each row of Table 3 regresses our measure of CARS exposure-the number of clunkers scaled by 2004 auto purchases-on one of the covariates listed above. High CARS exposure cities have lower income and house prices, and are less populated and more rural. However, despite lower incomes, high CARS exposure cities were less affected by the financial crisis.
They have lower default rates, less dependence on credit card borrowing, and enjoyed relatively higher house price growth during the crisis period (2006-09). There is no significant correlation between the level or change in unemployment and exposure to the CARS program. Table 3 shows that exposure to the CARS program is not random, which could pose a challenge to our empirical methodology. For example, it may be that demand for autos grows differentially during our sample period for high versus low income households, perhaps because low income households are impacted harder by the recession. Similarly, households with greater financial distress may display a greater slowdown in durable consumption (Mian and Sufi (2010) ). However, such attributes are not consistently correlated with CARS exposure in the same direction: high exposure cities have lower incomes, but they also have lower financial distress. Thus a priori it is not obvious that the significant correlates in Table 3 will bias our estimate of interest in a specific direction.
Nevertheless, we employ two empirical strategies that help us mitigate concerns regarding alternative explanations. First, the CARS program was implemented in just two months: July and August 2009. The sharp and short-lived nature of the program makes it difficult to argue that something else causes the sharp increase in high CARS exposure cities. Similarly, our methodology tests for both an initial increase and subsequent reversal. It is hard to construct alternative stories unrelated to CARS that explains both a short term boost and long term reversal. Second, we explicitly incorporate all observable correlates of the CARS exposure in Table 3 as additional controls. As we show later, none of these variables significantly affect the results.
The Effect of CARS on Auto Purchases
A. Initial Evidence
In Figure The bottom panel presents coefficients from the cumulative version of equation (2) Once we have the effects in terms of the ratio to lagged purchases for each decile, we multiply by lagged purchases to get the effect in terms of the number of cars. We then sum the number of cars for all deciles to get the total aggregate effect. Under the assumption that the bottom decile is a legitimate control group, we find that 340,000 cars were purchased under the program that would have otherwise not been purchased. Using the specification with control variables yields an estimate of 380,000 cars. Therefore, our estimates imply that the cross-city variation in exposure to the CARS program explains between 340,000 and 380,000 automobile purchases during July and August of 2009. This is more than half of the total purchases under the CARS program of 677,842. In the Appendix, we present coefficients from five alternative specifications of equation 
B. Statistical Inference
The increase and reversal in the preceding section are statistically significant. Panel A of Table 4 , presents the coefficient estimates on the CARS exposure variable from specification ( In other words, we can be 95% confident that a one standard deviation increase in CARS exposure does not increase cumulative auto purchases through June 2010 scaled by last year's purchases by more than 0.09. We can soundly reject the hypothesis that the coefficient in June 2010 is 0.210, which means we can reject the hypothesis that the CARS program led to a one time increase that was not reversed by June 2010.
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An alternative inference approach is to exploit the availability of monthly data going back to 2004. This allows for estimation of placebo specifications to assess how statistically "unusual" the patterns are during the months of and following CARS. In the top panel of Figure   6 , we plot coefficients on the CARS exposure variable from estimation of equation (3) 
The Effect of CARS on Other Economic Outcomes
The previous section shows evidence of a large effect of CARS that very quickly reverses. In this section, we address whether pulling forward auto purchases by seven to 10 months had measurable effects on economic activity. In the first subsection, we examine other economic outcomes in high and low CARS exposure cities. In the second subsection, we examine economic outcomes in cities with a large fraction of the population working in the automotive industry.
A. Other Economic Outcomes in High and Low CARS Exposure Cities
Before presenting results, we want to emphasize that our analysis here relies on the assumption that the fiscal multiplier is stronger in local economies than distant economies. In other words, if CARS had an effect on employment or other economic outcomes, we should see this effect stronger in the cities in which CARS induced a high number of auto purchases. If car purchases in a given city have an equally strong effect on economic outcomes in both the city in question and other cities, we will not see an effect on economic outcomes even if CARS had a broader effect on the economy.
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We have three economic outcomes available at the city-quarterly level: employment, household defaults, and house prices. Figure 8 shows the evolution of these outcomes in the four quarters prior and four quarter after CARS for the largest 250 cities in the sample. High and low CARS exposure cities are defined as in Household defaults and declines in house prices were much more severe in low CARS exposure counties prior to CARS, a result that is shown above in Table 3 . Once again, there does not appear to be any major structural break in the patterns after the CARS program. If anything, there is some evidence that the increase in household defaults moderated more in high CARS exposure cities. there is evidence that high CARS exposure cities experienced a relative increase in the default rate pattern and a relative decrease in the house price growth pattern.
B. Economic Outcomes in High versus Low Auto Employment Share Cities
One of the central arguments of proponents of the CARS program is that it had an effect on industrial production and manufacturing employment. splits cities by auto sector employment instead of CARS exposure. There is no evidence of a differential effect on auto purchases in high versus low auto sector employment cities. Figure 10 examines the other three outcomes. High auto sector employment cities experience a more severe drop in employment before the CARS program, and there is some evidence of a stronger rebound in employment in these areas, especially in the second quarter of 2010. In contrast, there is no evidence of a significant structural break for house prices or household defaults. Table 6 replicates Table 5 with the right hand side variable being the fraction of the population that is employed in the auto sector. The coefficient estimate in column 1 suggests that high auto sector employment cities experienced a relative increase in employment growth from the second quarter of 2009 to the second quarter of 2010. The estimate implies that a one standard deviation increase in auto sector employment share leads to a 1/4 standard deviation increase in employment growth. There is no difference in the patterns for default rates or house prices.
The evidence in Table 6 
Concluding Remarks
Recessions are often met with massive government intervention in the economy. Given that such interventions lead to a large build up of public debt, there is an important debate to be had on whether the benefits outweigh the costs. 19 However, the empirical evidence on this issue remains limited. This paper evaluates the effects of a popular form of fiscal stimulus-providing monetary incentives to boost consumption in the short-term.
The novelty of our analysis lies in part from our empirical strategy that exploits cross-city variation in exposure to a stimulus program. Doing so enables us to more effectively control for aggregate fluctuations in the economy and estimate the direct short and medium run effects of fiscal stimulus. Our results reveal a swift reversal in auto purchases at the expiration of CARS, which highlights a strong inter-temporal substitution that quickly "crowds out" the initial effect.
Our evidence suggests that the 'cash for clunkers' program, a program that cost $2.85 billion, had no long run effect on auto purchases.
The results of our analysis should be useful for assessing the feasibility of other durable goods stimulus programs, where the degree of inter-temporal substitution is suspected to be large (e.g., Eberly (1994) , Ogaki and Reinhart (1998) ). Recent examples of such proposals include the first-time home buyer credit or the cash for caulkers program. Indeed, aggregate evidence on existing home sales suggests a sharp reversal after the expiration of the first-time home buyer credit in the summer of 2010.
Our findings do not warrant the claim that all forms of fiscal stimulus fail to boost longrun economic output. It is conceivable that alternatively designed stimulus programs (e.g. extending unemployment benefits) have different implications for the economy. However, we where the left hand side variable is cumulative auto purchases from July 2009 until each month m. All specifications are weighted by total population of the city. 
Figure 6 Placebo Tests
This figure presents a series of placebo tests for the cumulative impact coefficients. In the top panel, we examine the cumulative effect for placebo experiments for every other month in our sample that does not enter into our treatment period. Each series of dots represents the cumulative difference in auto purchases for high CARS exposure cities in months where there is no CARS program. The solid blue line is the true CARS program that began in July 2009. The middle panel is identical except that the solid blue line begins in September 2009 to highlight the program reversal. The bottom panel plots only placebo tests that begin in July of each respective year. All tests include control variables for the logarithm of median household income, the unemployment rate, the default rate, the credit card utilization rate, the logarithm of median house price, the fraction of the city that is urban, and the natural logarithm of population. 
